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THREATS AND RISKS DURING TRANSPORTATION OF LNG ON 
EUROPEAN INLAND WATERWAYS 
 
Summary. This paper describes guidelines and recommendations for emergencies and 
incidents on inland waterways. It also provides a review of existing knowledge of an 
LNG incident that occurred along the European inland waterway corridors. The article 
also reports on the latest progress in incident guidelines and describes the tools for port 
authorities to control credible scenarios produced by human or technical failures. This 
paper aims to analyse the risks that occur during transportation of liquefied natural gas. 
The possible strategies for the elimination of LNG spills and accidents are also discussed. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of natural gas as a fuel has increased over the past few years. To move this fuel across 
oceans, natural gas must be converted into liquefied form. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a mixture 
of the several hydrocarbons with a very high proportion of methane (more than 91%). Like methane, 
LNG is odourless, colourless, nontoxic and noncorrosive. [1] [3] The liquefaction process is as 
follows: natural gas (NG) is at first extremely supercooled; thus, it is converted into a liquid. This 
procedure reduces its volume by more than 600 times – as shown in Fig. 2; when liquefied, natural gas 
(NG) that could fill a beach ball becomes LNG that can fit inside a ping-pong ball.  
                         
Fig. 1. LNG consists mostly of methane [1]           Fig. 2. Liquefaction process [1]  
 
LNG is used for propulsion systems on LNG carriers and is also used as fuel for inland waterway 
ships. For maritime navigation, LNG is different from the marine diesel oil (MDO). This contrast must 
be well understood when LNG has to be used for vessel propulsion: 
 LNG has to be stored at a very low temperature (circa -162°C) [2] [4]; 
 Any skin contact will cause burn injuries – LNG is a continuously boiling liquid; 
 Any contact with steel will cause brittle fractures; 
 During a cargo transshipment, excessive boil-off gas is generated (and must be managed); 
 It is a highly flammable substance. 
74                                                                                                   A. Galieriková, T. Kalina, J. Sosedová 
 
Despite the many dangerous properties of LNG, it is obvious that LNG is a clean fuel and its use 
has many advantages in minimisation of pollution on inland waterways. Table 1 shows the emissions 
saving with LNG propulsion systems in contrast with MDO engines. 
      Table 1 
The difference in minimisations of air emissions between LNG and diesel fuel [5] 
 
No. Characteristics MDO engine LNG engine 
1 Thermal efficiency 38% 50% 
2 CO2 emissions NO 25 – 30% 
3 NOx emissions NO 85% 
4 SOx emissions NO 100 % 
5 Particle emission reduction NO 100% 
 
 
2. BUILDING AND OPERATION OF LNG CARRIERS AND LNG-FUELLED SHIPS 
 
There are approximately 370 LNG carriers in operation, of which 60 LNG carriers are equipped as 
dual-fuel. The number of LNG-fuelled vessels in the global fleet is still limited. Recent data from 
DNV GL (Det Norske Veritas) report an operational fleet of 47 LNG-fuelled vessels, with another 85 
confirmed for delivery by the end of 2022, which represents a doubling of the fleet [13, 14]. 
 
Fig. 3. LNG ship fuel projects [13] 
 
The majority of the confirmed LNG-fueled ships worldwide operate in Norway. The European 
Union has established a role for LNG in its transport strategy for 2020 and is promoting the 
development of liquefied natural gas facilities through subsidies, what provides a financial incentive 
for use of such vessels.  
 
 
3. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
To date, there is no legislation for LNG-fuelled inland vessels; thus, all pilots are operating on 
special licenses. In 2015, LNG-fuelled vessels did not exist on the Danube river. In 2015, a pilot 
programme was conducted in Romania - rebuilding of inland tug to an LNG-fueled vessel. 
Thus, the transportation of LNG on inland waterways (as a dangerous good) must be performed in 
accordance with the ADN agreement (European Agreement on the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). According to the classification of dangerous goods defined 
in the ADN agreement, liquid natural gas is categorized as Class 2 – flammable gases. The ADN 
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agreement is obligatory for transportation of dangerous goods on every European inland waterway. 
ADN established an international agreement AND-R, which regulates the transportation of dangerous 
goods on the Rhine river and ADN-D for the Danube River. 
 
Fig. 4. Area of operation of LNG-fuelled vessels1 [13] 
 
Fig. 5. Divisions of ADN agreement 
 
 
4. POTENTIAL RISKS 
 
Possible hazards resulting from the spillage of large quantities of LNG (intentional or accidental) 
can be caused by many factors. The key determinants include the human impact, the conditions of the 
fairway and into ports, storage, fixture and stowage of goods and also the technical conditions of the 
vessel. [12] Fig. 4 presents an overview of possible scenarios that involve the release of LNG and 
consequences. 
There are many possible threats during the manipulation or transportation of LNG. In this part, we 
will precisely describe threats in the inland navigation. Collision incidents can lead to the deformation 
of the LNG containment and the release of LNG can occur. The effects of these incidents can 
adversely affect health, life, property and the environment. The following are the most common 
incidents where there is a heightened risk of loss of containment: 
- Collision with another vessel 
- Collision with jetties 
                                                          
1 Excluding inland barges and LNG carriers. 
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- Collision with bridges 
- Grounding of the ship 
 
4.1. Collision with another vessel 
 
The collision of vessels resulting in a breach of the LNG tank can result in the release of liquid into 
the separation section (between the tank and the ship´s hull). A large breach can result in a direct 
release into the water.  
The spill floating on the water will be warm, causing increased evaporation of the LNG [4]. The 
expansion of the spill across the water is caused by the river flow and the wind. 
 
4.2. Collision with jetties 
 
A collision with the quayside usually occurs during the manoeuvring, but because of the low speed 
during the manoeuvring, the probability of LNG release is very low. The more likely scenario is an 
incident when the LNG vessel on a berth is struck by another vessel. 
 
Fig. 6. Overview of possible scenarios involving the release of LNG and consequences 
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4.3. Collision with bridges 
 
The storage tanks of LNG located on the deck are not protected against the damage from the 
outside; thus, it is realistic to expect damage to the tank. This can lead to the release of LNG or gas 
vapour. Incidents of collision of vessels with a bridge are quite common. Fig. 5 shows an example of 
damage after a collision on the Elbe River (Germany). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Collision with the bridge on Elbe river [4] 
 
4.4. Grounding 
 
When a ship is powered by LNG, there is a need for storage of LNG fuel on board. In the case of 
grounding, the tank will not be damaged if the LNG fuel tank is placed on the deck. If the LNG fuel 
tank is located below deck, there may a small risk of damage to the tank  (in case of grounding, the 
impact on the hull of the ship is more than 0.8 m) [4]. If the LNG fuel tank is damaged, the LNG leaks 
and comes into contact with the water. This can lead to a gas or a vapour cloud, which can quickly 
develop on the water surface.  
 
 
5. RISK ASSESMENT 
 
The data available for LNG carriers show that manoeuvres of the LNG carriers in the harbours and 
berths are critical and often accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. The Class society and the 
flag state authority must approve the LNG risk assessment.  
There are two main studies dealing with the issue of risk assessment of LNG carriers. HAZID is the 
core of the qualitative risk assessment. The HAZID should be carried out as a review of the possible 
hazardous events that can occur based on previous accident experiences. A well-planned and 
comprehensive HAZID is a critical and important basis for the risk-assessment process. A 
comprehensive HAZID is an important basis of the risk-assessment process. The HAZID technique 
involves the following:  
- Workshop meeting with a multi-disciplinary team, which uses a special brainstorming 
technique based on a checklist of potential threats. 
- Means of identifying, describing and assessing threats and hazards at the earliest stage of 
development. 
- Rapid identification and description of processes. 
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- Then, the HAZID produces a list of hazards, ranked according to the consequences, and also 
recommendations for risk-reducing measures and an action plan. [14] 
FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) is a systematic analysis method for the identification of 
possible failures of technical systems or components for the detection of failure consequences and for 
the classification of failures. The main aim of an FMEA is to search for hidden failures and their 
prevention. The FMEA method is described by many technical standards (IEC Standard 60812, DIN 
25448, US Military Standard MIL-STD-1692,). For the assessment of the FMEA, the ranking of the 
results is performed and a criticality matrix is used. In the matrix, the failures are detected and shown 
according to the severity and the probability of occurrence [13, 14]. 
 
 
6. THREATS OF LNG RELEASE AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS  
 
In this chapter the situations that can occur in the case of LNG spills into the water are 
characterised. The possible scenarios, the means to deal with the negative consequences of the vapour 
release and the various types of fires and explosions that may occur are also identified. Therefore, the 
use of conventional probabilistic risk-assessment methods is acceptable. The risks associated with 
emergency incidents are determined by combining the occurrence and possible consequences to 
produce a risk ranking. The quantification of risks includes two parameters:  
- Probability of emergency incident, 
- Severity of consequence. 
 
6.1.  Vapour release 
 
A vapour release from an atmospheric tank can result in spill (pool) formation. The speed of 
release depends on the volume of vapour released. Release from elevated pressures or temperature 
tanks results in two phases of release: 
- 17% presents a pressure release 
- the remaining 83% forms a pool [4]. 
A vapour cloud must not migrate into confined space, inside the vessel or in buildings because an 
ignition of the vapour cloud can create a confined vapour cloud explosion and cause secondary fires. 
The following preventive measures can be used to avoid injury to persons: 
- If the vapour cloud is likely to enter inland vessel or buildings, the first priority is to remove 
every vessel near from the danger zone or evacuate all persons. 
- The residents or employees in the buildings along the waterway must be evacuated. 
- Any sources of ignition must be isolated or removed [4]. 
The vapour from the LNG pool can be covered by high-expansion finished foam on the surface of 
the LNG pool. With correct application, the concentration of vapour above the pool can be reduced by 
circa 50% [6]. 
 
6.2. Pool fires 
 
In the case of direct igniting of the vapour above the LNG spill (pool), the LNG burns off at 
various speeds. This depends on whether the pool is on the water or on land. 
LNG pool fires cannot be extinguished on water; thus, the emergencies must be dealt with as 
follows: 
- Prevent escalation – fire protection systems can prevent further escalation. The first fire would 
have already gone out before the first responders arrive. In the case of smaller LNG pool fires, 
the emergency response services should focus on cooling the remaining LNG tanks and ship´s 
construction. 
- Contain the fire. 
- Control the fire. 
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Burning time on water will be very quick – if the pool is extremely large, the duration of burning 
will be very short. In the case of small LNG pool fires, the emergency response services should focus 
on cooling the remaining LNG tanks and the construction of ships. The cooling should be performed 
using an up-wind approach (for example, from a firefighting vessel with water sprays directed towards 
the length of the vessel) [9]. Fig. 7 shows the strategies of firefighting. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Possible fire scenarios when LNG is spilt on water [4] 
 
A confined LNG pool fire occurs when the product cannot flow away and burns in a contained 
space. For fires in a small surface area (<10 m²), dry chemical powder should be used to extinguish the 
fire. Extinction with foam is not available in the case of greater fires (more than <10 m²), even though 
high ex foam can reduce the intensity of the fire, but need periodically “top up” of foam to be effectual 
[10]. 
 
6.3. Flash and jet fire 
 
Flash fire can occur when vapours drift in a downwind direction to a source of ignition or directly 
ignite. A jet fire may occur when a pressurized gas or fluid is released and forms a vapour cloud that 
can ignite. A jet fire has a powerful effect on equipment such as tanks or pipes that are not effectively 
isolated. Unprotected steel will fail very quickly because single hull LNG pressure tanks are sensitive 
to jet fires – failure of the containment can cause a rapid release of vaporising substances and a fire 
ball [4]. 
For a gas fire, there are two main steps: 
- Stop the flow of the LNG gas by an Emergency shutdown. 
- Protect all other tanks, pipes and ship construction and cool them with water-spray systems. It 
is recommended to use a thermal imaging camera to analyse whether the cooling effect has 
been achieved [4]. 
 
6.4. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) 
 
BLEVE can occur when the LNG tank fails at increased pressure usually due to flame trespass (jet 
fire) or mechanical impact on the containment. The subsequent decrease in pressure and ignition of the 
large vapour release cause a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE), usually 
recognised as a fire ball. 
The normal mechanism for BLEVE is a pressure vessel containing pressurised liquefied gas 
(pressurised LNG tank) subjected to external fire trespass or catastrophic failure due to other causes. 
Isolation of a pressurised tank contributes towards reducing the risk of escalation from the impacting 
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fire.  Physical barriers can prevent direct fire trespass and mechanical impact. For example, if the LNG 
fuel tank is situated below deck, the ship´s hull will act as a physical barrier [11]. 
 
 
6.5. Rapid phase transition 
 
In the event of spillage of LNG on the water, an accident called rapid phase transition (RPT) can 
occur. The RPT is a physical explosion that results because of the effect of uncontrollable boiling of 
cryogenic LNG through contact with water, whose temperature is high (12-17⁰C – depending on the 
mixing intensity [4]). We also found that RPT can occur when very hot gas is imported to a pipe that 
contains LNG. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Firefighting strategies 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The demand for LNG is increasing worldwide because it is an environment-friendly clean energy. 
In Europe and North America, new environmental regulations require reduction of local emissions. 
LNG is almost free from sulphur and particulates can help them to meet requirements. Liquefied 
natural gas has the potential to be used for cargo ships, ferries, barges and tugs. At present, it is used as 
a fuel for vessels on inland waterways, for example on the Rhine and Danube River or for ferries in 
Norway.  
LNG is classified by the ADN agreement as dangerous cargo. Because of this, it is necessary to 
perform a safety assessment, identify the risks of a possible spillage of LNG and to design measures 
for the prevention and mitigation of the effects in case of an accident. For this purpose, this paper 
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reports on the potential risks arising from the transportation of LNG by inland waterways and provides 
a variety of solutions and scenarios in the case of emergencies. Compliance with safety standards and 
recommendations will ensure safe transport and eliminate threats to health, life, the environment and 
property. 
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